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Abstract. Autoepistemic logic is one of the principal formalisms for
nonmonotonic reasoning. It extends propositional logic by offering the
ability to reason about an agent’s (lack of) knowledge or beliefs. More-
over, it is well known to generalize the stable model semantics of answer
set programming. Fuzzy logics on the other hand are multi-valued logics,
which allow to model the intensity with which a property is satisfied. We
combine these ideas to a fuzzy autoepistemic logic which can be used
to reason about one’s knowledge about the degrees to which proporties
are satisfied. In this paper we show that many properties from classical
autoepistemic logic remain valid under this generalization and that the
important relation between autoepistemic logic and answer set program-
ming is preserved in the sense that fuzzy autoepistemic logic generalizes
fuzzy answer set programming.
1 Introduction
Autoepistemic logic was introduced by Moore [16] as a way to reason about one’s
own beliefs. Later on (e.g. [15]), it was also seen as a tool to reflect about one’s
(lack of) knowledge. Consider for example my reason for believing that my sister
smokes. If she smoked, I would have smelled it on her breath and I would believe
she smoked: “smoke → breath” and “breath → B(smoke)”, where B means “I
believe”. Now suppose I have never smelled anything, thus I do not believe that
she smokes, then I can conclude that she does not smoke.
Since its introduction in the 1980s, autoepistemic logic has been one of the
principal formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. It has also found important
applications in logic programming. For example, Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] showed
a connection between answer sets of logic programs and expansions of autoepis-
temic theories.
Fuzzy logics (e.g. [8]) are a class of logics, whose semantics are based on truth
degrees that are taken from the unit interval [0, 1]. By admitting intermediary
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2truth values between 0 and 1, the intensity with which some property holds can
be encoded. From a practical point of view, fuzzy logics are thus useful to model
knowledge of continuous domains in a logical way. For example, instead of saying
that my sister smokes or not, a value between 0 and 1 can be given to specify
how much she smokes. Reconsider the rule “smoke→ breath”, but in the setting
of fuzzy logics. Then we may interpret this rule as “If she smoked a lot, her
breath would smell often.”
In this paper we combine the ideas of autoepistemic logic and fuzzy logics,
which to the best of our knowledge, has not previously been considered. The
resulting fuzzy autoepistemic logic is useful to reflect on one’s beliefs (or knowl-
edge) about the degrees to which some properties are satisfied. Consider for
example my reason for not believing that my sister smokes a lot. If she smoked
a lot, her breath would smell often. Since I do not smell it often, I do not believe
she smokes a lot. Intuitively, if the truth value of Bϕ is equal to c, this means
that we only know that ϕ is true at least to degree c. Note in particular that the
degrees of belief which we consider do not reflect strength of belief, but rather
a Boolean form of belief in graded properties. Furthermore, note how this view
generalizes the notion of belief from classical autoepistemic logic, in the sense
that having Bϕ false corresponds to having ϕ true to at least degree 0 and having
Bϕ true corresponds to having ϕ true at least to degree 1.
In this paper we show that many important proporties from classical au-
toepistemic logic remain valid when generalizing to fuzzy autoepistemic logic.
We also prove that the relation between autoepistemic logic and answer set pro-
gramming is preserved. In particular we show that the answer sets of a fuzzy
answer set program correspond to the stable expansions of an associated fuzzy
autoepistemic logic theory. The fact that this important relationship is preserved
provides further insight into the nature of fuzzy answer set programming, and
at the same time serves as a justification for the particular fuzzy autoepistemic
logic we introduce in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the necessary background
on autoepistemic logic and fuzzy logic is given. In Section 3 fuzzy autoepistemic
logic is introduced, its properties are investigated and a motivating example is
given. In Section 4, we briefly recall the basic notions of a fuzzy version of answer
set programming which was recently proposed and we analyze the relation with
fuzzy autoepistemic logic. We finish the paper by discussing related work and
our conclusions in Sections 5 and 6.
2 Background
2.1 Autoepistemic Logic
The formulas of autoepistemic logic are built from a set of propositional atoms A
using the usual propositional connectives and a modal operator B, interpreted as
“is believed” (or “is known”). For example, if ϕ is a formula, then Bϕ indicates
that ϕ is believed. Also, B(¬ϕ) indicates that ¬ϕ is believed and ¬(Bϕ) that ϕ
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A, and LB for the extension of L with the modal operator B. As done in the
literature (e.g. [13]), formulas from L are called objective and formulas from
LB are called unimodal. An autoepistemic theory is a set of unimodal formulas.
We define A′ = A ∪ {Bϕ | ϕ ∈ LB}, which is an infinite set, even if A is finite.
For technical reasons, we sometimes treat A′ as a set of atoms, and consider
interpretations I ′ ∈ P(A′), where P(X) = {Y | Y ⊆ X} for a set X. This trick
allows us to deal with autoepistemic theories in a purely propositional fashion.
For clarity, we will refer to the corresponding propositional language as L′.
The following definition was introduced by Moore [16] and is in line with
Stalnaker’s [20]3 view on the beliefs of a rational agent. For an arbitrary au-
toepistemic theory T , we can look for maximally conservative extensions which
make it stable, in the sense that no more conclusions can be drawn from a stable
theory than what is explicitly contained in it. Such extensions are called stable
expansions of T .
Definition 1. Suppose E and T are autoepistemic theories, then E is a stable
expansion of T iff
E = Cn(T ∪ {Bϕ | ϕ ∈ E} ∪ {¬Bϕ | ϕ /∈ E}),
where Cn(X) denotes the set of propositional consequences of X w.r.t. the lan-
guage L′.
Remark that Definition 1 says that a formula α is in E iff for each interpre-
tation I ′ ∈ P(A′) such that I ′ |= T ∪ {Bϕ | ϕ ∈ E} ∪ {¬Bϕ | ϕ /∈ E} we have
that I ′ |= α. Moreover, the set of models of T ∪{Bϕ | ϕ ∈ E}∪{¬Bϕ | ϕ /∈ E} is
exactly the set of models of E. By using Definition 1, the following proposition
can be proved.
Proposition 1. [14] Suppose T is a consistent autoepistemic theory. If all for-
mulas in T are objective, then T has exactly one stable expansion.
Autoepistemic logic can also be described in terms of models, more like a
possible worlds semantics [17]. The relationship between this semantics and the
one used in Definition 1 will become clear in Proposition 2. Suppose I ∈ P(A)
is an interpretation on A and S ⊆ P(A) a set of interpretations on A. The
corresponding satisfaction relation for unimodal formulas is defined inductively:
– For an atom p, (I, S) |= p iff p ∈ I.
– For a unimodal formula ϕ, (I, S) |= Bϕ iff for every J ∈ S, (J, S) |= ϕ.
– For unimodal formulas ϕ and ψ, the propositional connectives are handled
in the usual way:
• (I, S) |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (I, S) |= ϕ and (I, S) |= ψ
• (I, S) |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff (I, S) |= ϕ or (I, S) |= ψ
• (I, S) |= (¬ϕ) iff (I, S) 2 ϕ
3 Article based on the unpublished manuscript (1980) to which Moore referred.
4• (I, S) |= (ϕ→ ψ) iff (I, S) 2 ϕ or (I, S) |= ψ
• (I, S) |= (ϕ↔ ψ) iff (I, S) |= (ϕ→ ψ) and (I, S) |= (ψ → ϕ)
Intuitively, a unimodal formula ϕ is believed to be true, if it is true in every
interpretation which is considered possible.
Definition 2. Suppose T is an autoepistemic theory and S is a set of interpre-
tations on A, then S is an autoepistemic model of T iff
S = {I | I ∈ P(A),∀ϕ ∈ T : (I, S) |= ϕ} .
In other words, an autoepistemic model is a set of interpretations which
model all formulas of T .
Definition 3. Suppose S is a set of interpretations on A and T is an autoepis-
temic theory, then T is called the (autoepistemic) theory of S iff
T = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ LB,∀I ∈ S : (I, S) |= ϕ} ,
We will write Th(S) to denote this set of formulas.
The set Th(S) contains all formulas that are true in every interpretation in
S. The following proposition describes the relation between stable expansions
and autoepistemic models.
Proposition 2. [17] Suppose T is an autoepistemic theory, then an autoepis-
temic theory E is a stable expansion of T iff E = Th(S) for some autoepistemic
model S of T .
We will now discuss the relationship between answer set programming [7]
and autoepistemic logic. A brief refresher on answer set programming is pro-
vided in Appendix A. Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] proposed the following trans-
formation from a program P to an autoepistemic theory λ(P ). For each rule
s ← a1, . . . , am,not b1, . . . ,not bn in P , the unimodal formula a1 ∧ . . . ∧ am ∧
¬Bb1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Bbn → s is added to λ(P ). The following result clarifies the rela-
tionship between the answer sets of P and the stable expansions of λ(P ).
Theorem 1. [6],[7] A logic program P has an answer set4 M iff λ(P ) has a
stable expansion E such that M = E ∩ BP .
2.2 Fuzzy Logics
Fuzzy logics [8] are based on an infinite number of truth degrees, taken from
the unit interval [0, 1]. We will consider fuzzy logics whose formulas are built
from a set of atoms A, the truth constants in [0, 1] ∩ Q and arbitrary n-ary
4 We refer to Appendix A for definitions and notations regarding answer set program-
ming.
5connectives for each n ∈ N. In particular, the semantics of logical conjunc-
tion can be generalized to [0, 1] by a class of functions called triangular norms
(short t-norms). These are mappings T : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] which are symmet-
ric, associative and increasing and which satisfy T (1, x) = x for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Given a t-norm T , logical implication can be generalized by the residuation of
T , x →T y = sup {λ | λ ∈ [0, 1] and T (x, λ) ≤ y}. If T is a left-continuous t-
norm we have the important property x →T y = 1 iff x ≤ y. By using the
residuation it is possible to define a generalization of the logical equivalence
x↔T y = min {x→T y, y →T x}. Negation can be generalized by a decreasing
map ∼: [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfying ∼ 1 = 0 and ∼ 0 = 1. In what follows we will
only use residual implicators based on left-continuous t-norms and if there is no
confusion possible we will write x→ y and x↔ y.
An interpretation is a mapping I : A→ [0, 1], which is also called a fuzzy set
on A. We can extend this interpretation as follows. Consider for each n ∈ N a
finite set of n-ary connectives Fn and let F = ∪Fn. Each f ∈ Fn is interpreted
by a function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]. We define [f(α1, . . . , αn)]I = f([α1]I , . . . , [αn]I)
for formulas αi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). For c ∈ [0, 1] we have [c]I = c. If T is a set of
formulas we say that I is a model of T iff [α]I = 1 for all α ∈ T ; we write this
as I |= T .
In examples we will consider the connectives from  Lukasiewicz logic, however
all theorems can be proved for connectives f ∈ F . In the case of  Lukasiewicz
logic, the conjunction is defined as x ⊗ y = max(x + y − 1, 0), which is a left-
continuous t-norm. The disjunction is generalized by x⊕ y = min(x+ y, 1). The
implicator induced by the  Lukasiewicz t-norm is x→l y = min(1, 1− x+ y) and
for the negation we have ¬x = 1− x.
3 Fuzzy Autoepistemic Logic
In this section, we combine the ideas of autoepistemic logic and fuzzy logics.
This will provide us a tool to reason about one’s beliefs about the degrees to
which one or more properties are satisfied. Let us consider an example, for which
we will use  Lukasiewicz logic. Note that the main results in this section are valid
for arbitrary connectives in F .
Example 1. Suppose we want to host a party for three persons. Since we do not
know how much each guest will eat, it is not easy to determine how much food
we need to order. Let us denote this latter amount by a variable a that ranges
between ordering no food at all and ordering the maximum amount of food.
Obviously, the correct value for a depends on the amount of food ai (i = 1, 2, 3)
that we need to order for each individual guest. The variable ai represents the
proposition that person i eats a full portion. For an interpretation I, I(ai) de-
notes which percentage of a full portion person i eats. By appropriately rescaling
the food quantities we can assume, without lack of generality, that I(ai) ∈ [0, 13 ]
for each graded interpretation I, such that it holds that I |= a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3 ↔l a
6iff I(a1) + I(a2) + I(a3) = I(a). We thus consider the following formulas.
ai →l 1
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(1)
a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3 ↔l a. (2)
If no further information about the values ai is known, it is best to make sure
that everybody has enough food by ordering the maximum amount. By encoding
additional beliefs we will try to refine this upper bound. Suppose we believe that
everyone will eat at least a certain amount of food. We express this as
Ba1 ↔l 0.1,Ba2 ↔l 0.1,Ba3 ↔l 0.05. (3)
As in classical autoepistemic logic, we can treat formulas Bϕ as atoms. For each
interpretation I, we then have that I |= Bai ↔l ci iff [Bai]I = ci. Later on, it
will become more clear why including a formula such as Bai ↔l ci expresses a
lower bound for the truth value of ai. For each model I we have that [Bai]I = ci
implies I(ai) ≥ ci.
Furthermore, we assume that if someone would eat an exceptional amount
of food, we would have some information about this. For example, this could
be the case if our friend brings her new boyfriend. If he would have an extreme
appetite, we believe that she would have warned us. Insisting that we would
know exactly how much each person would eat, i.e. ai →l Bai, would be too
strong. We may consider the following weaker variant however, which expresses
that no guest will eat more than three times the amount mentioned in (3). We
represent this meta-knowledge as follows:
ai →l Bai ⊕ Bai ⊕ Bai. (4)
Indeed, I |= ai →l Bai⊕Bai⊕Bai iff I(ai) ≤ 3[Bai]I . In addition, we may be able
to further decrease the amount of food that needs to be ordered if we know that
some of the guests are on a diet. We will represent this by a variable di which
represents the proposition that person i is on an extreme diet. If I(di) = 0,
person i eats like he/she normally eats and if I(di) = 1, he/she will eat the
amount mentioned in (3). Suppose we have information on d2 and d3, but no
knowledge on d1:
Bd2 ↔l 0.95,Bd3 ↔l 0.95. (5)
If the lower bound for di increases, the upper bound for ai should decrease.
Consider for instance the meta-knowledge
Bdi →l (ai →l Bai). (6)
Remark that this expression is equivalent to ai →l (Bdi →l Bai), thus I |=
Bdi →l (ai →l Bai) iff I(ai) ≤ 1 + [Bai]I − [Bdi]I .
In example 4, we will use fuzzy autoepistemic logic to determine an upper
bound for I(a) for a model I.
7The formulas in fuzzy autoepistemic logic are built from a set A (atoms and
constants in [0, 1] ∩Q), the set of connectives F with their corresponding func-
tions f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] (n ∈ N) and a modal operator B, interpreted as “is
believed”. We will denote this language as LB. Again, we will make the distinc-
tion between objective and unimodal formulas. An autoepistemic theory in LB is
a set of formulas in LB. As before, we define A
′ = A∪{Bϕ | ϕ ∈ LB}. We write
F(A′) for the set of all fuzzy sets on A′, i.e. the set of all graded interpretations
I ′ over A′. We define a generalization of stable expansions (Definition 1).
Definition 4. Suppose T is an autoepistemic theory in LB and E is a fuzzy set
on LB. E is a fuzzy stable expansion of T iff for each α ∈ LB
E(α) = inf
{
[α]I′ | I ′ |= T ∪
{
Bϕ↔ E(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ LB
}
, I ′ ∈ F(A′)}
In Definition 1, for each I ′ ∈ P(A′) such that I ′ |= T ∪ {Bϕ | ϕ ∈ E} ∪
{¬Bϕ | ϕ /∈ E} we had that Bϕ ∈ I ′ iff ϕ ∈ E. To see the relation between
Definitions 1 and 4, note that I ′ is a model of Bϕ↔ E(ϕ) iff [Bϕ]I′ = E(ϕ).
Remark that for a fuzzy stable expansion E of T and I ′, J ′ ∈ {I ′ | I ′ |= T∪
{Bϕ↔ E(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ LB} , I ′ ∈ F(A′)} we have that [Bα]I′ = E(α) ≤ [α]J′ . Hence,
[Bα]I′ = 0.1 intuively means that α is true to at least degree 0.1, instead of be-
lieving that α is true to exactly degree 0.1.
We can also generalize Definitions 2 and 3. First, we need to define another
type of evaluation for unimodal formulas. Suppose I ∈ F(A) is an interpretation
and S ⊆ F(A) is a set of interpretations.
– For an atom or a constant p: [p]I,S = I(p).
– For a unimodal formula α: [Bα]I,S = infJ∈S [α]J,S .
– For unimodal formulas αi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and f ∈ Fn:
[f(α1, . . . , αn)]I,S = f([α1]I,S , . . . , [αn]I,S).
Definition 5. Suppose T is an autoepistemic theory in LB and S ⊆ F(A) is a
set of interpretations. S is a fuzzy autoepistemic model of T iff
S = {I | I ∈ F(A),∀ϕ ∈ T : [ϕ]I,S = 1} .
Example 2. Suppose T = {¬(Ba)→l b,¬(Bb)→l a}. We try to find a fuzzy
autoepistemic model S of T . For the first formula of T we have for S ⊆ F(A) and
I ∈ S that [¬(Ba)→l b]I,S = 1⇔ 1− [Ba]I,S ≤ I(b)⇔ 1− I(b) ≤ infJ∈S J(a).
By symmetry we have [¬(Bb)→l a]I,S = 1⇔ 1− I(a) ≤ infJ∈S J(b).
Hence, a set of interpretations S is a fuzzy autoepistemic model of T iff
S = {I | I ∈ F(A), 1− I(b) ≤ infJ∈S J(a) and 1− I(a) ≤ infJ∈S J(b)}. More-
over, we can show that the fuzzy autoepistemic models of T are all sets of
the form Sx = {I | I ∈ F(A), I(a) ≥ x and I(b) ≥ 1− x}, with x ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 6. Suppose S ⊆ F(A) is a set of interpretations. The fuzzy au-
toepistemic theory of S is the fuzzy set Th(S) on LB such that for each unimodal
formula ϕ
Th(S)(ϕ) = inf
I∈S
[ϕ]I,S .
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Proposition 3. Suppose T is an autoepistemic theory in LB. A fuzzy set E on
LB is a fuzzy stable expansion of T iff E = Th(S) with S a fuzzy autoepistemic
model of T .
Example 3. Reconsider the theory T from Example 2 and recall that all fuzzy au-
toepistemic models are of the form Sx = {I | I(a) ≥ x and I(b) ≥ 1− x}. Hence,
for each x ∈ [0, 1] we have a fuzzy stable expansion Ex defined by Ex(a) =
Th(Sx)(a) = infI∈Sx I(a) = x and Ex(b) = Th(Sx)(b) = infI∈Sx I(b) = 1− x.
Proposition 4. Suppose T is a consistent set of objective formulas in LB, then
there is exactly one fuzzy set E on LB that is a fuzzy stable expansion of T .
Example 4. Reconsider Example 1. Based on the formulas (2)-(6), an upper
bound for I(a) (I a model) can be derived. This is accomplished by determining
the fuzzy autoepistemic models of the corresponding autoepistemic theory T .
Suppose S ⊆ F(A), then we determine which conditions need to be satisfied for
I ∈ S such that S is a fuzzy autoepistemic model of T :
I(ai) ≤ 13
I(a1) + I(a2) + I(a3) = I(a)
[Ba1]I,S = 0.1, [Ba2]I,S = 0.1, [Ba3]I,S = 0.05
I(ai) ≤ 3[Bai]I,S
[Bd2]I,S = 0.95, [Bd3]I,S = 0.95
[Bdi]I,S ≤ 1− I(ai) + [Bai]I,S
For example, let us compute the upper bound for I(a2). Without the knowledge
about the diet, we know that I(a2) ≤ 0.3. If we include our beliefs about d2, we
get a much lower upper bound 0.15.
One can easily verify that there is exactly one fuzzy autoepistemic model
S = {I | 0.1 ≤ I(a1) ≤ 0.3, 0.1 ≤ I(a2) ≤ 0.15, 0.05 ≤ I(a3) ≤ 0.10,
I(d1) ≥ 0, I(d2) ≥ 0.95, I(d3) ≥ 0.95, 0.25 ≤ I(a) ≤ 0.55} .
We thus believe that the amount of food that will be needed is between 0.25 and
0.55. Hence we will order 55% of the maximal order. Note that this means that
we can express the lower bound on a as E(Ba) = 0.25 and the upper bound as
E(¬B(¬a)) = 0.55, where E = Th(S) is the unique stable expansion of T .
4 Relation between Fuzzy Answer Set Programming and
Fuzzy Autoepistemic Logic
Let us briefly recall the basic notion of a fuzzy version of answer set program-
ming, which was recently proposed [10]. Consider a set of atoms A. Here, a literal
is either an atom a ∈ A or an expression of the form not a, where a ∈ A and not
is the negation-as-failure operator. A rule over [0, 1] is an expression of the form
9r : a← f(b1, . . . , bn) where a ∈ A, bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are literals, ← corresponds to
a residual implicator and f ∈ Fn. To assure the existence of a unique answer set
we need to restrict to connectives f such that f is increasing in each argument.
Typically f corresponds to the application of conjunctions and disjunctions in a
given fuzzy logic. We will refer to the rule by its label r. The atom a is called
the head of r and f(b1, . . . , bn) is the body. A FASP program over [0, 1] is a set
of rules over [0, 1]. We denote the set of atoms occurring in a FASP program as
BP . An interpretation I of a FASP program P is a mapping I : BP → [0, 1]. We
can extend this mapping as follows:
– [c]I = c for c ∈ [0, 1],
– [not a]I =∼ ([a]I) for atoms a and a negator ∼,
– [f(b1, . . . bn)]I = f([b1]I , . . . [bn]I) for bodies of rules,
– [r]I = ([rb]I → I(rh)), for a rule r : rh ← rb.
For interpretations I1 and I2 we say that I1 ≤ I2 iff I1(a) ≤ I2(a) for all a ∈ BP .
An interpretation I is called a model of P iff [r]I = 1 for all r ∈ P . Finally we
say that a FASP program is simple if it contains no literals of the form not a.
For such programs there exists a unique minimal model.
Definition 7. [10] Consider a simple FASP program P . An interpretation I of
P is called the answer set of P iff it is the minimal model of P .
For programs which are not simple, answer sets are defined using a general-
ization of the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct (see Appendix A). Specifically, let P be
a FASP program and I an interpretation of P . The reduct of a literal l w.r.t. I
is defined as follows. If l is an atom then lI = l, if l = not a then lI = [l]I . The
reduct of a rule in P , r : a← f(b1, . . . , bn) is defined as rI : aI ← f(bI1, . . . , bIn).
The reduct of the program P is the set of rules P I =
{
rI | r ∈ P}.
Definition 8. [10] Consider a FASP program P . An interpretation I of P is
called an answer set of P iff I is the answer set of P I .
In this section we will show a correspondence between answer sets of a FASP
program P and fuzzy stable expansions of an associated autoepistemic theory in
LB. From Theorem 1, we already know that such a correspondence exists between
classical ASP and autoepistemic logic. Here we use a similar transformation.
Suppose we have a FASP program P with rules of the form
r : a← f(b1, . . . , bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm),
where a, bi and cj are atoms (1 ≤ i ≤ n),(1 ≤ j ≤ m) and f ∈ Fn+m. We define a
set of implications in fuzzy autoepistemic logic. Specifically, for rule r we define
the associated fuzzy autoepistemic formula λ(r) as
f(b1, . . . , bn,∼1 Bc1, . . . ,∼m Bcm)→ a.
We choose ∼i as the negator which is assumed for not ci, thus for I ∈ F(BP ), we
have [not ci]I =∼i (I(ci)). The resulting autoepistemic theory in LB is λ(P ) =
{λ(r) | r ∈ P}.
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First, we provide a lemma that characterizes the relationship between stable
expansions of λ(P ) and stable expansions of the autoepistemic theory corre-
sponding to a specific reduct of the program P . Note that we use the notation
E|BP for the restriction of the fuzzy set E on LB to BP .
Lemma 1. Consider a FASP program P and a fuzzy set E on LB. Then E is
a fuzzy stable expansion of λ(P ) iff E is a stable expansion of λ(P E¯), where
E¯ = E|BP .
Theorem 2. Consider a FASP program P . M is an answer set of P iff λ(P )
has a fuzzy stable expansion E such that E|BP = M .
Example 5. Consider the logic program P = {b←l not a, a←l not b}. We will
compute the answer sets by using the characterization from Theorem 2. We
look for fuzzy stable expansions of λ(P ) = {¬Ba→l b,¬Bb→l a}. Remark
that this is the theory T we studied in Examples 2 and 3. Hence we know
that for each x ∈ [0, 1] there is a fuzzy stable expansion Th(Sx), with Sx =
{I | I(a) ≥ x and I(b) ≥ 1− x}. Hence for each x ∈ [0, 1] there is an answer set
Mx such that Mx(a) = Th(S)(a) = infI∈Sx I(a) = x and Mx(b) = Th(S)(b) =
infI∈Sx I(b) = 1− x.
5 Related Work
Epistemic logic, the logic of epistemic notions such as knowledge and belief,
is a major area of research in artifical intelligence. Von Wright’s seminal work
[22] is widely recognized as having initiated the formal study of epistemic logic
as we know it today. Since then, various axiomatizations have been proposed,
mainly in terms of possible-worlds semantics. An overview is given in [19]. Note
that in general, epistemic logics may allow to model the beliefs of several agents,
whereas autoepistemic logic is restricted to one’s own beliefs. Autoepistemic logic
has been important as an epistemic foundation for answer set set programming,
which has also been studied from the angle of possibilistic logic [2], [4].
In recent years a variety of approaches to fuzzy answer set programming have
been proposed, e.g. [3], [10], [21]. In [18] a fuzzy equilibrium logic was introduced,
and a correspondence between fuzzy equilibrium logic models and answer sets of
FASP programs was shown. Apart from this exception and our paper, it appears
that little work has been done on nonmonotonic fuzzy logics nor about their
relationship with fuzzy answer set programming.
We remark that fuzzy autoepistemic logic is also related to some work on
fuzzy modal logics, see e.g. [9]. Another relevant paper is [1], where an epis-
temic modal logic is defined which is inspired by possibilistic logic. In this logic,
interpretations are also sets of classical interpretations. Finally, there has also
work been done on (finite) many-valued modal logics [11] and (finite) many-
valued reflexive autoepistemic logic [12]. Instead of [0, 1], finite Heyting algebras
are used for the space of truth values. Finitely-valued Go¨del logic (truth values{
0, 1n ,
2
n , . . . 1
}
) is a particular case of such algebras.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a fuzzy version of autoepistemic logic, which
can be used to reason about one’s beliefs about the degrees to which properties
are satisfied. We have shown that important properties of classical autoepistemic
logic are preserved and that the relation between answer set programming and
autoepistemic logic remains valid when generalizing to fuzzy logics. These results
lead to a better comprehension of how to interpret fuzzy answer sets.
In future work, it would be interesting to see whether the implementation
of classical autoepistemic logic by using quantified boolean formulas [5] can be
extended to fuzzy logics using multi-level linear programming. If this is indeed
the case, it could be used as a basis to implement fuzzy autoepistemic logic
reasoners, as well as fuzzy answer set programming solvers. The general theory
of fuzzy autoepistemic logic is also useful for abductive reasoning about theories
with gradual propositions.
A Answer Set Programming (ASP)
We define a literal as either an atom or an atom preceded by not, the negation-
as-failure operator. Intuitively, we say that not a is true if there is no proof to
support atom a. If X is a set of atoms, we define not (X) = {not a | a ∈ X}. A
normal rule is an expression of the form a← (α∪ not (β)), with a an atom and
α and β sets of atoms. The atom a is called the head of the rule and α∪not (β)
(interpreted as conjunction) is the body.
A normal program P is a finite set of normal rules. The Herbrand base BP of
P is the set of atoms occuring in P . An interpretation I of P is any set of atoms
I ⊆ BP . A simple rule is a normal rule without negation-as-failure. A simple
program is a finite set of simple rules. If an interpretation I is the minimal model
of P (i.e. the minimal interpretation such that [r]I = 1 for each r ∈ P ), then we
say that I is the answer set of P . Thus, the answer set of a simple program P is
the maximal set of atoms that can be deduced from P . For programs that are not
simple, answer sets are defined using the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct. Suppose P is
a normal program, the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct [7] of P w.r.t. the interpretation
I is the set P I = {a← α | (a← (α ∪ not (β)) ∈ P, β ∩ I = ∅}, which is a simple
program. We then say that I is an answer set of P iff I is the answer set of P I .
Note that simple programs have exactly one answer set, while normal pro-
grams can have 0, 1 or more answer sets.
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